| Road Manager
Security and Our Road and Bridge
Infrastructure
How vulnerable are we? And what can we
do to protect our assets?
by Ruth W.
Stidger, Editor-in-Chief
(note - for better view of tables, we advise the .pdf
version - click here)
Addressing potential threats to the highway system is particularly
challenging because of the openness....” says Federal Highway
Administrator Mary Peters. “Several strategies [can] help us accomplish
this....”
A lot of the work of determining vulnerability and response strategies
has been sponsored by the American Association of State Highway and
Transportation Officials, in cooperation with the Federal Highway
Administration, and under a grant from the National Cooperative Highway
Research Program.
A guide to assess state DOT vulnerability was prepared by Science
Applications International Corporation under this sponsorship. They
outline six steps, ranging from identifying critical assets to reviewing
operational security planning.
Critical assets ID
 State
DOT officials can use three steps to identify critical assets, the SAIC
reports. A team of operations and maintenance staff, design and
construction engineers, traffic engineers, and field personnel should
decide the specific assets required to do their job in the area of
infrastructure, facilities, equipment, and personnel. An accompanying
table — shows assets that most agencies will include.
Some states break these areas into additional categories. Maryland’s
DOT, for instance, lists potential targets grouped into 12 areas: bridges
and overpasses, major office complexes, communications control points,
Interstate roads, arterial roads, maintenance facilities, regional
laboratories, district office buildings, satellite maintenance facilities,
magnesium chloride storage, salt storage, and rest areas.
Once a department decides on asset categories, the next step is to
establish and assign values to critical asset factors. A second table
shows how this can be done.
Vulnerability
 Not
all assets are equally vulnerable. Assessing vulnerability begins with
characterizing the potential threat to each asset.
Most-vulnerable assets will be those that prevent response to terrorism
or other threats — such as a bridge, which might be destroyed to stop
critical use of an Interstate route for evacuation or for moving
equipment.
Such a move, if terrorists were successful, could slow movement of
needed military personnel, too.
Once vulnerability is established, agencies need to identify the
possible level of exposure. One system to use relies on the federal
Homeland Security levels — low, guarded, elevated, high, and severe.
Factors used in this assessment, says Tom Ridge, head of Homeland
Security, are:
1. Is the threat credible?
2. Is the threat corroborated?
3. Is the threat specific and/or imminent?
4. How grave is the threat?
 The
FHWA recommends that state DOTs consider some additional criteria.
Is there a group or individual in their area known to be a threat?
Has the DOT experienced past terrorist activity?
Is there credible information that a group or individual has the
training, skills, finances, and resources to carry out a terrorist act?
Is there credible information that indicates specific terrorist
operations against a critical asset?
Even one yes answer to these questions shows concerns about threats to
transportation assets. A positive response to the last of the questions
indicates an imminent threat, the guide says.
Assign vulnerability factor values next. An accompanying table shows
typical values that state DOTs assign to factors. Then, specific
transportation assets are scored.
The consequences
Assessing possible consequences helps identify assets which, if
attacked, produce the greatest risks the guide reports.
Criticality and vulnerability of each asset are rated from 0 to 100.
Assets with a high criticality and high vulnerability receive the most
protection.
Those with high criticality and low vulnerability come next in setting
up countermeasures.
Countermeasures
 Assessing
vulnerability is one thing; doing something about protecting an asset is
something more.
Countermeasures can include site-work elements such as surrounding an
area or using barriers, landforms, and standoff distances to protect the
asset. Bridges and other structures need key access points protected, as
well.
 Detection
of intruders, weapons, or explosives can be targeted using closed-circuit
TV, motion detectors, alarms, weapons and explosion detectors, and
chemical and biological weapon detectors.
Protection procedures, such as limiting access, can provide low-cost
countermeasures.
An accompanying table shows countermeasures already in use by Maryland
and Texas.
Specific countermeasures are shown in a separate table below.
The costs
Security isn’t inexpensive. “The first step in cost estimation is
to package countermeasures in ways that make sense operationally and from
a vulnerability reduction perspective,” the guide says.
This may mean rotating video surveillance or combining multiple
countermeasures for a vulnerable asset, such as a critical bridge with no
alternate structure within 30 or 40 miles.
Some agencies and contractors rank specific countermeasure costs as
high, medium, or low and try to match their level to asset criticality and
vulnerability.
A table using this method shows how the technique can be applied.
Operational planning
Foiling terrorists is a new thought for most agency and contractor
personnel. U.S. Army security manuals and the American Public
Transportation Association Web site, www.apta.org,
provide basic information.
State DOTs may be able to use emergency plans for dealing with natural
disasters as a beginning framework, even though there are many
differences.
A basic plan may include area security, access restrictions,
countermeasures, and contingency planning.
Training and exercise activities should be put into place to ensure
personnel can actually use planned countermeasures.
Response plans
 AASHTO
and the NCHRP sponsored a second guide. A Guide to Updating Highway
Emergency Response Plans for Terrorist Incidents was prepared by Parsons
Brinckerhoff-PB Farradyne.
Weapons of mass destruction threats may be quite different from
conventional emergencies, this guide reminds transportation personnel.
They may or may not be immediately recognizable as terrorist incidents.
Such incidents place responders at high risk. They may also result in
widespread contamination of critical equipment and facilities.
State DOTs carry responsibilities beyond their own assets, since roads
may be needed for many critical tasks, including evacuation of residents
from an area, moving materials or equipment, and even moving military
personnel.
Agencies may need to recommend alternate transportation if one method
is rendered unusable by terrorist actions.
Agency and contractor engineers will probably be the first called to
assess the condition of highways, bridges, and tunnels if attacked and
damaged.
This guide includes multiple checklists to help determine internal
agency or company readiness, steps to take, and program setup and
operation.
One interesting area considers the use of ITS devices already in place
— cameras, variable message signs, and other computerized devices that
can help respond to a terrorist action.
The guide stresses the importance of adequate independent communication
capability, such as field-to-field radios, two-way pagers, vehicle
scanners, and so on.
For more information about the guides or to download complete copies,
go to www.transportation.org
(note - for better view of tables, we advise the .pdf
version - click here)
Reprinted from Better Roads Magazine
April 2003 |
